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GLD-012        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3300 
___________ 
 
ELIZABETH HARVEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PETER G. LOFTUS; C. KENT PRICE, Esquire;  
JUDGE M. MUNLEY, in his official and individual capacities;  
RAMANI AYER, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer;  
HARFORD INSURANCE CO. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-10-cv-02505) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 12, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 27, 2012) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Elizabeth Harvey, proceeding pro se, appeals an order from the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing her complaint and an 
order denying her motion to reconsider that dismissal.  Because this appeal presents no 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
I. 
 In December 2010, Harvey filed a complaint in the District Court that she 
amended in March 2011, broadly asserting three claims against Ramani Ayer, Peter 
Loftus, Judge James M. Munley, Kent Price, and Does 1-5.  The claims and defendants 
were related to a separate civil case Harvey was pursuing.  The first claim was a 
malpractice claim against Loftus, Harvey’s attorney in the civil case, alleging that he 
failed in his professional obligations to Harvey and thereby violated her constitutional 
rights to due process and equal protection.   Harvey next claimed that Ayer, Loftus, Judge 
Munley, and Price conspired to have Harvey accept a settlement offer so that Judge 
Munley could take a vacation rather than preside over her trial, and when she refused to 
settle the trial was sabotaged.  Harvey finally claimed that the defendants deprived her of 
her constitutional rights and caused her severe emotional distress for which she sought 
relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1977).     
All named defendants filed motions to dismiss, and, on May 23, 2012, Harvey 
responded and waived objection to dismissal of the claims against Ayer and Price.  
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Harvey’s response to the motions to dismiss did not provide additional factual 
allegations.    
On June 8, 2012, the District Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), dismissed the complaint with prejudice as to the second and third claims; it 
dismissed the first claim as a pendent state law claim over which it did not have 
supplemental jurisdiction.  Harvey filed a “Motion for Extension of Time To For a 30 
Days Extension of Time to Respond to and/or Seek Further Consideration of Court’s 
6/7/2012 Order Dismissing This Action” on June 18, 2012.  Harvey’s motion generally 
requested (1) a thirty day extension “to seek further consideration of the Court’s action” 
and potentially “file a Second Amended Complaint” and (2), in the alternative, relief 
from the order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) “[o]r any other 
applicable rule under F.R.C.P.”  The motion’s basis for an extension of time was a flu-
like illness that Harvey suffered.  In regard to the request for relief under Rule 60(b)(3), 
the motion broadly accused the District Court of favoring the defendants, prejudicing 
Harvey, and potentially acting with “impermissable [sic] motive.”  
On June 19, 2012, the District Court denied Harvey’s motion, without 
characterizing it, but the District Court did note its unpersuasiveness.  Harvey filed a 
notice of appeal on August 14, 2012, specifically challenging the District Court’s order 
denying the motion.  On appeal, Harvey generally alleges that fraud tainted the 
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proceedings in the District Court and that the District Court “completely ignored” facts 
for the purpose of “concealment or non-disclosure of a material fact.”1 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we may affirm 
on any grounds supported by the record.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 121 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Although the notice of appeal only referenced the denial of Harvey’s Rule 
60(b) motion, we construe it liberally to encompass both orders.
2
  See Ghana v. Holland, 
226 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Our review of the District Court’s grant of Loftus and Judge Munley’s motions to 
dismiss is de novo.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  In 
order to survive dismissal a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
                                              
1
  Harvey’s response to the Clerk’s notice of possible summary affirmance raised 
concerns regarding whether this Court received the record from the District Court.  The 
District Court record was made available electronically to this Court on August 17, 2012.  
Notice was electronically mailed to all defendants, but notice was not sent to Harvey.  In 
deciding this matter we reviewed the District Court’s record and Harvey’s response to the 
notice of potential summary affirmance.  
2
 Ordinarily, when a United States officer, such as Judge Munley, is sued in an official 
capacity, an appeal must be filed within sixty days of the appealed order or judgment.  
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).  However, when a party files a timely motion under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60 within twenty-eight days after judgment is entered, the time to 
file an appeal is tolled until the date of the District Court’s disposition of the post-
judgment motion.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); see also Long v. Atlantic City Police 
Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 440 (3d Cir. 2012).  In this case, Harvey filed her Rule 60 motion 
on June 18, 2012, ten days after the June 8th order dismissing the case, thereby tolling the 
appeal period until “the entry of the order disposing of” the motion.  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(4)(A).  The district court denied Harvey’s motion on June 19, 2012, at which time 
the sixty-day appeal period began running.   Harvey’s notice of appeal was therefore 
timely filed on August 14, 2012, within sixty days of the District Court’s June 19th order.   
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true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009).  A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Id.  We review the denial of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion for abuse of 
discretion.  Budget Blinds of NJ, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Lorenzo v. Griffith, 12 F.3d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1993).  We may summarily affirm if the 
appeal presents no substantial questions.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
III. 
Harvey alleged that Judge Munley made critical comments during a settlement 
conference and read jury instructions improperly in furtherance of a conspiracy to punish 
Harvey for not accepting a settlement offer.  All of the allegations against Judge Munley 
concerned acts taken in his judicial capacity and in a matter over which he had 
jurisdiction.  Absolute judicial immunity shields judges from liability for such acts.  
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S 193, 199 (1985).  Judicial immunity attaches even if the 
act was done in furtherance of a conspiracy.  Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 26-27 
(1980).  Thus, Judge Munley is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for Harvey’s 
conspiracy claim.  Judge Munley is likewise entitled to absolute judicial immunity for 
Harvey’s Bivens claim.  See Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under 
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section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.”).  Accordingly, the 
District Court correctly dismissed all claims against him with prejudice.  
 
IV. 
 The District Court’s dismissal of the conspiracy claim against Loftus was 
appropriate because Harvey’s allegations and the reasonable inferences they supported 
failed to state a conspiracy claim.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Young v. Kann, 
926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is a longstanding rule in the Third Circuit 
that a mere general allegation . . . of conspiracy or collusion without alleging the facts 
which constituted such conspiracy or collusion is a conclusion of law and is insufficient 
[to state a claim].” (alteration in original) (quoting Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing 
Co., Inc., 595 F.Supp. 1385, 1400 (D.Del. 1984), aff’d, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985)).  As 
the District Court correctly determined, Harvey’s complaint did not rise above general 
allegations and conjecture.  Because Harvey’s complaint failed to provide sufficient 
factual allegations to support an inference of agreement between the defendants, we agree 
with the District Court’s dismissal of Harvey’s conspiracy claim against Loftus with 
prejudice.
 3
   
                                              
3
 In her response to the motions to dismiss, Harvey argued that her complaint satisfied the 
fair notice pleading standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  That standard was 
abrogated by and replaced with the plausibility standard of pleading in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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 Harvey sought damages under a Bivens action against Loftus for emotional 
distress suffered as a result of the alleged conspiracy.  The Bivens action relied on the 
improperly pled conspiracy claim, thus it is also insufficient.  We therefore affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of the Bivens action against Loftus with prejudice.4  See 
Hughes, 242 F.3d at 121 n.1.   
Finally, we concur in the District Court’s decision to not exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law malpractice claim against Loftus.  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 
see Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).  
V. 
Harvey requested relief under Rule 60(b)(3) from the dismissal of her complaint.  
In order to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the moving party “must establish that the 
adverse party engaged in fraud or other misconduct and that the misconduct prevented 
the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his case.”  Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 
F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1983).  Harvey’s 60(b)(3) motion did not allege fraud or 
misconduct against the defendants;  rather, she alleged misconduct on the part of the 
District Court.  
                                              
4
 The District Court dismissed the Bivens action against Loftus as brought outside the 
two-year statute of limitations.  The duration of the alleged conspiracy is unclear and we 
are not convinced that this claim should have been dismissed for violating a statute of 
limitations.  Regardless, any error was harmless because the complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  See McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548, 553-54 (1984); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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 Alleged misconduct of the District Court may be remedied by a motion pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(6) “in extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme 
and unexpected hardship would occur.”  Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d 
Cir. 1993); see also Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999).  Harvey’s motion 
made no concrete allegations of misconduct, and primarily addressed the District Court’s 
rulings that were adverse to her.  Accordingly, because Harvey did not allege any fraud 
perpetrated by an adverse party and did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances  or 
extreme hardship caused by the District Court, there was no basis for relief under Rule 
60(b). 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, this appeal presents no substantial question and we will 
summarily affirm.   
